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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the 
University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the re­






It should in every particular aim at the well­
being of the Filipinos. We must accept this new 
responsibility as a trust for civilization. We want 
no tribute-bearing colonies. The colonial history of 
Spain, Holland, and England contains valuable lessons 
by which we must j>rofit. Their experience demonstrat­
es the folly of selfishness—  the more selfish the pol­
icy, the more complete its failure. If, with the 
warning of their experience, we repeat their blunders, 




The United States* colonial policy in the Philip­
pines as first enunciated "by President McKinley contem­
plated the preparation of the islanders for a speedy par­
ticipation in the government with the ultimate object of 
granting them independence under a democracy in the form 
of a republic. This policy has been accompanied, nobody 
can deny, by the thought of introducing big business for 
commercial gains, but it nevertheless remained America’s 
firm conviction. If such has been so, the Philippine peo­
ple owe much to the Democratic Party because of its con­
stant denunciations against imperialistic notions.
.
Thus the Filipinos were from time to time given grad­
ual participation in the mechanition and direction of their 
own affairs. It was not until 1913, however, when they 
were given full control of the legislative branch of the 
government. Pull Pilipino autonomy has been accelerated 
by the passage of the Jones Act, usually called the Phil­
ippine Act of 1S16 which is the basis of American colonial 
policy. Through it, Pilipinization became wholly complete. 
America's pledge to redeem its promise seemed at an end.
But in the face of the Republican rule certain alterations 
have been made—— policy of further trusteeship was envok- 
ed, independence was made remote. It is then the object 
of this thesis to follow the trend of America’s govern-
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mental mind, from the passage of the Jones Act in 1S16 
to the last days of the Republican administration in 1932.
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Before the advent of American occupation, the Fili­
pinos were engaged in a revolution for emancipation against 
Spain. It was a losing struggle, ’out determined as they 
were, they fought courageously and met every odd and handi­
cap with a willingness to sacrifice all that which they 
possessed for the sake of freedom.
In the course of the struggle, the Filipinos wrested 
from the arrogant and autocratic imperial government the 
Treaty of Biak-na-Bato which was signed with the understand­
ing that the Spanish government was to introduce reforms 
while the native leaders were to exile themselves on pay­
ment of a million dollars. The Philippine leaders fulfilled 
their share of the agreement, but the political myopia of 
Spain compelled her not only to ignore her written promise 
but continued her usual attitude and even went further to 
make conditions unbearable. In a spirit of unison, the 
Filipinos under the Aguinaldo leadership once more raised 
the battle cry against the Bourbon suzerainty.
In the meantime the Teller resolution ushered the de­
claration of war between the United States and Spain. By 
instructions from Washington, under the direction of Assis­
tant Secretary of Havy Theodore Roosevelt, Admiral Dewey
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proceeded to Manila Bay wherein the decaying Spanish fleet 
remained intact. The battle of Manila, famous for its his­
torical significance, took place on May 1, 1898.
Simultaneously, through the efforts of American Con­
sul-General Edwin Wildman, acting through the wishes of 
Admiral Dewey, General Aguinaldo was brought back to the 
Philippines on board the U. S. Gunboat McCullock. Thus 
arriving in Cavite, May 19th, he was encouraged to organize 
his countrymen. Guns and munitions were given him from the 
Spanisn Arsenal.
B. ABORTIVE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC AKD THE WAR
Hot wanting in respect and not slow in recognizing 
what the Americans have done, Aguinaldo, in his proclama­
tion of May 24th, claims them liberators of his country.^ 
The Eilipino spirit ran high and with the cooperation of 
the United States Army and Havy a vigorous campaign was 
fought. The opportune time had come. Plans were devised 
to organize and establish a republic. Accordingly, a 
temporary "Dictatorial Government" with General Aguinaldo 
as the head, was proclaimed on June 18th only to be fol­
lowed later by the promulgation on January 23, 1899, of 
the Constitution of the-Philippine Republic.
Eor almost a year since the capitulation of Manila,
<'° U . S. Philippine Commission, "Report'1, Vol. I, 
p. 171 1900
ra;U. S. Congress, 57:1; "Sen. Doc." 331, p. 2955
August 18,1898, an amicable understanding existed between
the two joint military forces. However after the ad op­
' 1.3) ticn of the Treaty of Paris on December 10th, the peaceful
relationship between the tv/o peoples assumed ominous fore­
bodings. General 7/esley Merritt went to the Philippines 
with a definite instruction not to recognize the then exist 
ing Philippine Republic, instead to establish a j>rovisional 
government. He was succeeded by General Otis who refused 
to continue the joint occupation of Manila with General 
Aguinaldo. Hence, on September 5, 1898, he v/rote in a some
what mandatory manner _tc> the Filipino chieftain to with- 
r4)draw. A convulsion of hatred was at once aroused in every 
native heart. The force of hatred rapidly gained momentum 
and like a cyclone of fury it burst against the wall of 
American determination. The Filipino-American conflict 
commenced on the 4th of February of the following year, 
later developed into a guerilla warfare, and ended in the 
capture of General Aguinaldo by General Funs ton in March, 
1901. Psychologically and politi­
cs) The Treaty was adopted by the United States Con­
gress with a vote of 57 to 27, one vote more than 
the required two-thirds vote. (Feb. 6, 1898.)
(4) U. S. War Dept., “Annual Report,” 1899, Vol.I 
Part IV, p. 9

callv speaking, the acknowledgment by the native leader of 
American sovereignty put an end to the abortive Philippine 
Republic. Its fate was finally sealed by the presidential 
decree on the twenty first of December*
C. I3TC5PTIQIT OF AMERICAIT RULE
Almost three months after the ratification of the 
(*)treaty of Paris, the Republican administration sent tne 
Schurman Commission which arrived there on March 4, 1899.
Up to 1900, the government of the Philippines was military. 
An immediate effort was therefore made to re-establish law 
and order. The first measure which the President under­
took was the appointment of a Board of Commissioners to as­
sume the duties of the first Commission and to act as a leg­
islative body. Mr. Taft who was to "inaugurate governments 
essentially popular in their form as fast as territory is 
held by our troops" was inaugurated the first Civil Govern­
or in 1901. Thus civil government was established all over 
the archipelago, although a few provinces still remained 
under the military government for the obvious reason that
• -4-
^President McKinley affixed his signature on Feb­
ruary 10, 1889; the ^ueen Regent affixed hers the 
following day.
(^Philippine Islands, "Acts and Treaties Pertaining 
to the Philippines'* Appendix V, p. 125, Washing­
ton Government Printing Office, 1925
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they were not completely pacified.
(1)The president’s instructions to the Commission were 
executed accordingly; popular control was extended slowly 
yet steadily. Hence, in 1901 and 1902, municipal govern­
ments were placed in the hands of the Filipinos. The na­
tive voters were allowed to elect their municipal officials 
and, later on, in 1903, the provinces were allowed to elect
(g)their governors. There was a Provincial Board in each pro­
vince composed of a governor and two members. These third 
members at first were appointive, but like the governor, 
they, too, later became elective. In 1907, popular control 
virtually became complete. And so, consistent with the 
provisions of the Cooper Act of 1902, the first elective 
assembly was inaugurated. The Philipine Legislature at 
that time was composed of an Assembly as a lower branch 
and a Commission presided over by the Governor-General as 
the Upper House.
Evidently, the Democratic administration at Washing­
ton, mindful of the tremendous progress shown by the Fili­
pinos in the careful manipulation of their own affairs, un­
hesitatingly granted them full control of the Legislative
(7^ Ibid Appendix V pp. 125-130.
f^Kalaw, M. M., "The Proceedings of the First Inde­
pendence Congress”, pp. 95-133, 1930.
-S-
department by giving them in 1913 a majority in the Commis­
sion. The usual deadlock between the two houses, the upper 
controlled by an American majority, the lower by the natives, 
at last came to an end.
A more decisive step taken toward the fulfillment of 
the Democracy’s policy of Filipino autonomy and self-rule 
came in 1916 when the Congress passed the Jones Act, or 
Philippine Autonomy Act, pledging the people of this coun­
try to recognize the independence of the Philippines "as 
soon as a stable government can be established therein."
The Act considers the necessity of giving them, as a pre­
paration for that policy, what Dean Kalaw says, "the great­
est amount of autonomy compatible with the exercise of the 
rights of American sovereignty.* '
Three years after the passage of the famous act, the 
islanders became convinced that the only condition pres­
cribed in the laxv has been fulfilled. The Philippine Le­
gislature sent a Special Mission to the United States to 
present the fact and to urge the fulfillment and redemp­
tion of. America1 s pledge. It was at this juncture that 
President Wilson in his last message to Congress recommend­
ed the voting of independence to the Philippines, but Con­
gress did not act on the chief executive’s recognition.
The problem was laid squarely upon the shoulders of the 
next administration.
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President Harding, viewing with seriousness the ur­
gency for solution of the Philippine question, authorized 
the Wood-Forbes Kission to dig facts and to bring home 
pictures of the real conditions existing therein. It is 
interesting to note that the high calibre of the special 
envoys clearly manifest the superlative regard attached 
by the administration to its colonial policy.
The knowledge of Major-General Wood of the general 
conditions of the archipelago which he acquired first as 
a governor of the !Toroland, then as a member of the Mis­
sion, amply qualified him for the post of Governor-General. 
On October 15, 1921, he was inaugurated the successor of 
Hon. Francis Burton Harrison. His administration was one 
characterized by various incidents hurtful to the Fili­
pino-American relationship. His ITussolinian poliey led to 
the resignation of all the Filipino members of the cabinet 
and to the campaign of passive revolution. The total ab­
sence of cooperation greatly paralyzed the affairs of the 
islands and involved the sending of numerous missions to 
the United States. His practically self-imrjosed duty to 
run the whole machinery of government v/ithout the proper 
coordination of parts obviously became unbearable. He was 
an able leader, but human as he was, he slowly succumbed 
to the ordeals of his exalted position.

After M s  death, Sr. Stimson was appointed by Presi­
dent Coolidge to assume the post* On March 1, 1928, he 
delivered at Luneta his inaugural address wherein he out­
lined his economic policy and his desire to regain cooper­
ation. As a corporate lawyer and as a diplomat, he was 
unmistakably qualified to meet the situation. Instead of 
following the course pursued by the late general or taking 
sides with the native leaders, he assumed a middle road.
The establishment of the Cabinet and the re-creation of 
the Council of State really gained for him the respect and 
confidence of the Philippine people. But his administra­
tion did not last long, for shortly after he established 
hiraself there, he was tendered the honor of being the Sec­
retary of State under the Hoover administration. However, 
his policy based on ''enlightened trusteeship and hostile 
to all forms of exploi tation1’ continued to persist.
Mr. Dwight Davis followed his predecessor’s safe path. 
In his first Philippine speech, he stressed the necessity 
of economic development of the islands and of honesty in 
government. Under his regime, there was a perfect peace 
and order save the temporary fracas created by Mr. Hoover’s 
appointment of Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt for Vice-CJovernor- 
General and head of the Department of Public Instruction. 
The whole Filipino nation coupled by a great number of the 
United States Senate objected to the appointment on the
-8-
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grounds of Mr. Roosevelt’s imperialistic notions as express­
ed in his book entitled: PHILIPPINES:. A TREASURE AID A 
PROBLEM.
president Hoover showed his political sportsmanship in 
the meticulous manipulation of the affair. A brief discus­
sion of this political affray vail be shown in the latter 
part of chapter V. The president was given an opportunity 
to show his friendliness toward the Philippines when Gover- 
noa?-Oeneral Davis resigned from his post. Immediately, Hr. 
Hoover sent the name of Col. Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the 
present Governor of Porto Rico to the Senate. His appoint­
ment won wide acclamation because of the appointee’s sym­
pathy with the common man. He arrived in Manila on January, 
1932. •
THE PHILIPPINE ORGANIC ACT OE IS16 
Chapter II
A. JUSTIFICATION OE ITS PASSAGE
Erom time to time since the inception of American 
sovereignty, the Philippine problem confronted every ad­
ministration at Washington, the leaders of which expressed 
hope for the early separation of those island groups. In 
a message to Congress, December, 1899, president McKinley 
decl&red:
"We ahall continue as we have begun,...to make 
these people......feel that it is their liberty
and not our power....we are seeking to enhance."
President Roosevelt has the following to say:
"Apparently its (the present administration’s) 
course in the Philippines has proceeded upon the 
theory that Eilipinos are now fit to govern them­
selves. Whatever may be our personal and indivi­
dual beliefs in this matter, we ought not as a 
nation, to break faith or even to seem to break 
faith. "0*
In like manner, President Taft declared that American pol­
icy "must logically reduce and finally end the sovereignty 
of the United States" in the archipelago. Although the 
Republican platforms were silent on this matter of Eilipino 
separation which the Democrats considered as manifestation
of imperialistic designs, the Republican Presidential utter-
(1) Ex-President Roosevelt’s pronouncement in an
article as quoted by Senator King, Senate hearings, 
1930, p. 94.
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ances affirm the policies advocated by the Democratic plat­
forms . (2)
For many years, Bryan, as the titular head of his par­
ty, strenously and unflinchingly lambasted the opposite 
party for its imperialistic tendencies —  tendencies diamet­
rically opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. For 
three presidential years, Democratic platforms announced 
their policies toward the Philippines. The platform in 
1900, uncompromisingly denounced the Republican administra­
tion as placing this great American Commonwealth ''previously 
known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of 
freedom, in the false and un-American position of crushing 
with military force the efforts of our former allies to 
achieve liberty and self-government....." The 1912 Demo­
cratic platform ux^ on which Wilson was elected president, 
states:
"We reaffirm the xoosition thrice announced by 
the Democracy in national convention assembled 
against a policy of imperialistic and colonial 
exploitation in the Philippines....We favour 
an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose 
to recognize the independence of the Philippine 
Islands as soon as a stable government can be 
establi shed."o )
(z) This has been pointed out by Ur. Taft in a pub­
lic address, March, 1918.
^"Democratic Text Book", p. 30, 1912
-12-
By virtue of the mandate of the American electorate,
the Democratic party withheld the idea that the policies
enumerated in its platform justified the administration’s
future actions. Accordingly, President Wilson, acting
under authority vested in him, announced to Congress his
action of according the "peotJle of the islands a majority
in the Philippine Commission by appointing five instead
of four native citizens."
"I believe that in this way", says the presi­
dent, "we shall make proof of their capacity in 
counsel and their sense of responsibility in the 
exercise of political power, and the success of 
this step will be sure to clear our view for the 
steps which are to follow. Step by step we should 
extend and perfect .the system of self-government 
in the islands, making the test of them and modify­
ing them as experience discloses their successes 
and failures: that we should more and more put 
under the control of the native citizens of the 
archipelago the essential instruments of their 
life, their local instrumentalities of government, 
their schools, all the common interests of their 
communities, and so by counsel and experience set 
up a government which all the world will see to 
be suitable to a people whose affairs are under 
their control." f*r)
To fulfill the letter and spirit of this insular policy 
Filipinization commenced earnestly and steadily. The island 
ers availed themselves of the chance; proved their abilities
fv) Wilson, W., "Messages and papers of the Presidents," 
Bureau of national Literatures, Inc., 1913-17, 
pp. 1910-11.
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"in counsel" and "sense of responsibility" without the
least misgivings and apprehensions on the part of the
administration. The successes of the colonial experiment,
prompted the Democratic Congress to act accordingly. But
it seemed as if from the psychological standpoint Congress
was timid to go to the extreme. Senator Lodge tells us 
(fthat though frankly desirous of getting rid of the islands, 
but lacking the courage to do so, Congress passed the Jones 
Act, thus completely changing the situation.
B. TEE C0KE7BRST02TE OF A?£SRICAIT COLONIAL POLICY
By almost unanimous vote of Congress, the United
States lias committed herself to a. policy of withdrawal from
the Philippines. From the adoption of the Jones Law:
An act to declare the purpose of the people of 
the United States as to the future status of the 
people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide 
a more autonomous government for those islands...
the administration in Washington conceded the fullest lib­
erty of action and freedom from interference with the gov­
ernment of the Philippines. "The United States," says ’.Tr. 
Fenwick, :,had already pledged itself to recognize the in­
dependence of the Philippine Islands when they had given 
promise of their ability to maintain a stable government." ^
-13-
(S) Lodge, C., "Our Failure in the Philippines" 
Harper’s Magazine, Vol. 160, p. 211
(€) Fenwick, C., "internatisnal Law/ p. 238
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Perhaps it would be worthwhile to note the sentiment 
expressed by the late President Roosevelt in a pronounce­
ment attributed to him with regard to a definite pledge put 
forth in the Act. I quote:
"Personally, I think it is a fine and high 
thing for a nation to have done such a deed 
with such a purpose. But we can not taint it 
with bad faith. If we act so that the natives 
understand us to have made a definite promise, 
then we should live up to that promise."^
In a similar tone, Governor-General Harrison 3aid
that the spirit of the Jones Law was without question
that of self-government for the Filipino people and that
it was incumbent upon the Governor-General to carry out
the terms of the act with as much consideration as possible
(8)for that principle. The passage of the Jones Act marked 
the beginning of the new era in Filipino-American relation­
ship. It has embarked this country on a new colonial pol­
icy never before attempted by any colonial power.
G. HIGHLIGHTS OF......
2he rnilippine organic Act stipulates the vast recon­
struction of the Insular Government. For the sake of brev­
ity I intend to point out that which I consider the high-
(7) The late President Roosevelt's article written 
in Everybody’s llagazine, January, 1915.
(©) Harrison, R. 3., "Cornerstone of Philippine Inde­
pendence", p. 203

lights of the act conducive to the grant of greater auton­
omy and to the points of contention.
1. Suffrage
The act created an elective legislature, "but all cit­
izens could not vote for its members. Hence, it stipulates 
the following conditions: All male individuals (not to 
include convicts and insane) twenty-one years old and over 
not subjects or citizens of a foreign country, if residents 
in the Philippine Islands one year and in the municipality 
six months, provided they come within the following classi­
fications:
Firstly, Those who under the previous laws were legal 
voters and had exercised the right. This referred to men 
who held public office during the Spanish regime or during 
the early American occupation.
Secondly, Those that owned at least 3250 worth of real 
property or paid at least $15 a year of taxes.
Thirdly, Those able to read and write either Spanish, 
English, or a native dialect. ($)
Within the limitations of these provisions, sixty-one 
per cent of the via ole 1918 population were qualified voters
0?) 3. 381, Philippine Organic Act, Sec. 15
Almost eighty-six per cent of the total qualified regis­
tered voters went to the polls in the 1919 general elec­
tion as compared to the forty-nine per cent, hen :"r. Cool-
i
idge was elected President of the United States.
2 . Legislature 
The Organic Law divided and subdivided the archipelago
//a)
into twelve senatorial and ninety representative districts, 
each district was drawn according to jiopulation. Each sen­
atorial district was to have two senators holding office 
for six years, half of the senate body to be elected every
Jtsfnc'tthree years, and each representative, was to have one repre­
sentative holding a terra of three years. Senators of the 
twelfth senatorial district and nine representatives of the 
same division, representing the so-called non-Christian 
Filipinos, were to be appointed by the Governor-General with 
the advice and consent of the Insular Senate. Elections 
were to take place on the first Tuesday in June, and the 
Legislature to convene on October 15th next thereafter (now 
amended to July 16th by the Insular Legislature.) .
Laws passed by this body must be submitted to the 
Governor-General for his signature. He had the right of
0°) Ibid, Sec. 16
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veto which could be over-ruled by a two-thirds vote of 
both houses. If he disapproved of the measure for the 
second tine, he could send it to the president of the 
United States for his final action. A duration of six 
months had been set for the President for his final ac­
tion, after which when approved becomes a law, if not, 
dead. This ^^residential power had never been used so far. 
All laws passed by the Legislature must be reported to 
the Congress of the United States, which thereby reserved 
"power and authority to annul the same." This power of 
Congress may be discussed later under the heading, A1?0_ 
ITALICS OP THE ACT . ^  Two resident Commissioners to Wash­
ington -;;ere to be elected by the Legislature for a term 
of three years, and were to receive equal official recog­
nition and equal privileges and immunities as any member 
of Congress.
3. Governor-General 
The Organic Act'vested in the Governor-General what 
is called the supreme executive power. He was to be ap­
pointed by the President with the approval of the United 
States Senate, and to hold office at the pleasure of the 
nation’s chief. The said Governor-General was to have
W Ibid Sec. 19
O^Ibid Sec. 20
the general supervision and control of all the depart­
ments and bureaux of the Insular Government nas far as 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this actn which 
as we shall see later became the spring of controversy 
between the executive and legislative departments. An 
annual report was required of him to be submitted to the 
Executive Department assigned by the President. This re­
port, in turn, was to be submitted by the authorized ex­
ecutive department (War Department) to the United States 
Congress. 'Why this peculiar governmental procedure is 
done, I can not very well understand, but one writer as­
cribed it rtto the quaint operations of the Congressional 
mind."
Furthermore, he was empowered to appoint all import­
ant officials including the two Senators and nine Repre­
sentatives of the non-Christian people, by and with the 
consent of the Insular Senate. It is specified, however, 
that this does not include the Vice-Governor-General, 
the Insular auditor, and the Justices of the Supreme Court.
He could order investigation into official conduct; 
determine when it was necessary to practice emminent do­
main; order the examination of the books and accounts of 
the Auditor and Treasurer; reserve from settlement of pub­
lic lands; deport, after an investigation, from the Phil­
ippines any citizen of a foreign power; order the concen-
-18-
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tration of the people, with the approval of the Senate, 
for protection and order. Also, he had charge of all ex­
tradition cases; had supervision over the correspondence 
touching the foreign relations of the Philippine Islands. 
And he was made head of the Bureau of Audits and the Bur­
eau of Civil Service.
The direct supervision by Governor-General of the 
Civil Service Bureau made it possible for him, (I5r. Har­
rison), to accomplish his policy of Filipinization.
4. Vice-Governor-General 
He, too, like the Governor-General was to be appoint­
ed by the president by and with the consent of the Senate. 
He was to act as the head of the Department of Public In­
struction and was to assume the vacancy left by the resig­
nation or leave of absence of the Governor-General.^^
5. Insular Audi tor and Deputy Audi tor 
These two Insular officials, "who shall examine, au­
dit, and settle all accounts'* pertaining to the revenues 
and receipts of the governments, likewise that of the pro­
vincial and municipal governments, were to be appointed 
by the president with the approval of the United States
(43) Ibid Sec. 21
(/4J Ibid Sec. 23
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Senate. Strangely enough, they were to send an annual re­
port to the Secretary of War, which procedure remains as 
the relic of the Military Government.
6. Courts
The Supreme Court, the Courts of First Instance, the 
Municipal Courts, were to he continued on the existing 
system. The Chief Justice and the associate justices were 
to be appointed by the president of the United States by 
and with the advice and consent of the United States Sen­
ate. The judges of the Court of First Instance and the 
justices of the Peace or Police Courts were to be appointed 
by the Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine 
Senate. The Jones Act stipulates that the Supreme Court 
and the Courts of First Instance should remain under the 
jurisdiction of the admiralty until further changes are 
effected by the Congress. (**)
D. AHOLIALIES OF THE ACT
1. ABSOLUTE POWER OF CONGRESS OVER ISLAND LEGISLATURE
"There is something patently un-American", says Mr. 
Morley, "in our failure to give any constitutional guar-
(O ) Ibid, 3ec. 24
(ie ) Ibid, Sec. 26
antees or safeguards to the people of the Philippines." CfT) 
This statement seems far from being true, but when one 
remembers the absolute power of Congress over the insu­
lar Legislature, one adheres to the above opinion. It 
is not unlike a suspended electric light bulb which when 
cut from the point of suspension at the instant drops and 
breaks itself to unrecognizable pieces. Such is the stat­
us of the Philippine law-making body. Section 19 of the 
Act, referred to in this chapter, stipulates that "all 
laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature shall be re­
ported to the Congress of the United States, which here­
by reserves the power and authority to annul the same."
Is it not obvious from the letter, not to say the spirit, 
of this item of the law that a mere majority of votes in 
both houses of Congress with the consent of the President 
can wipe out of existence the insular Legislature? To. 
put it in another way, is it not possible for the sake of 
argument, that with such a composition of Congress, as a 
reactionary measure, can alter the basic law and political 
status of the Philippines? A leading Filipino student of 
the Constitution, in a frank statement, declared: "Con­
gress can keep the Philippines in perpetual dependency, 
convert it into the state of the Union, or declare it free
-21-
,  * it  P
(iTJ ’Torle^, Oux Far Eastern Assignment, p. 151.

and independent. n(/t)
nominally autonomous, the Philippine islands have 
surely much less-guaranteed self-government than any 
state of the Union. They are allowed to send two Resi­
dent Commissioners to the United States Congress, who can 
talk, but can not vote or participate in the division on 
the floor of the House of Representatives.
However, the Congress of the United States has thus 
far been scrupulously careful to exercise this enormous 
and arbitrary power over the Filipinos cautiously, never­
theless, Filipino leaders are not without fear for what
Congress may do-- "a fear which is quite comprehensive
in view of the general ignorance of our Senators and Rep­
resentatives on Philippine sentiments and conditions."W )
2. GOVERNOR- GENERAL« S P0VE3R OF APPOIITTTIEITT
Senator Lodge, one of the staunchest opponents of the 
Wilsonian administration, gives his own biting criticisms 
of the act— an act which he contends inaugurated the "sys­
tem of American responsibility without authority." The 
American chief executive of the Philippines "is one of the 
most hopeless creations in the whole of Governmental his­
tory." He goes on to say, "He is supposed to represent 
the sovereignty of the United States, and in that capacity
-22-
n^Kalaw, M. M., The Present Government of the Phil­
ippines,p. 113
<7^ ’*orley, op. cit. p. 151
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he can appoint no one to public office without the con­
sent of the Filipino Legislature. He i3 thus a complete 
contradiction in terras." (2°)
Senator Lodge’s criticism have been indirectly, if 
not directly acknowledged by Governor-General Harrison in 
his book, ’Cornerstone of Philippine Independence." But 
how can the Democracy’s policy of Filipinization be exe­
cuted without finding some contradictions, inconsistencies, 
and flaws in the machinery of government?
E. SIGNIFICANCE OP THE ACT
Rational thinkers, sometimes, argue that an act should 
be judged not by the means, but by the ends. If we were 
to ignore the anomalies applied in the former as in the 
case of the Jones Act and turn our eyes to the latter as 
in the policy of Filipinization, we find as it has been 
done, the flowers of American humanitarianism and American 
thought.
The conditions set forth in the Act represent a not­
able progressive change in colonial policies. They not 
alone affect the relationship between colonial power and 
dependency, but also touch the sphere of international
Lodge, C., "Our Failure in the Philippines”, 
Harper’s Magazine, Vol. 160, p. 212.
politics. The act, as a whole, signifies "not only an 
act of reparation, an abandonment of the Imperialistic 
doctrine, which constitutes the profession of faith of 
the great powers, hut also the adoption of a new dogma 
that implies the renunciation of acquired rights, v/here 
these rights are not founded upon morality and justice. 
It signifies, moreover, the noble and loyal fulfillment 
of all engagements implied in the voluntary acceptance 
of a trusteeship for the well-being of the Filipinos, 
and the inauguration of a new method for the peaceful 
and legal solution of the question of one people’s de­
pendence upon another. It further signifies the reaf­
firmation of the principle enounced in the Declaration 
of Independence, that peoples should always be governed 
by their own consent, never without their consent." t* 1'
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(aJ) Quoted by the R. of Rs., Vol. 54, pp. 221-2,
1916, .from an article published by the Hon.
Rafael Palma in the Philippines Review (Manila).
POLICY: POWER OP COITTROL AND SUPERVISION
Chapter III
A. THE CHANGE OP ADKCITI STRATI OH
There is a legal maxim in a Latin version which says:
"Perpetua lex est nullam legem humanam ac positivam per-
petuam esse, et clausula quae abrogationem exclusit ah
Ci)initio non valet." This maxim runs true when we infer it 
in the change of administration at Washington. If we take 
the Republican Party as an example, which assumed power on 
Karch 4, 1921, we find that its principles and policies 
toward the Philippine archipelago were in complete rever­
sion with those enunciated and executed by its opponent 
and predecessor. It is the intention of this chapter to 
show the turn of colonial policy, from the Democracy’s 
theory of fast Filipinization and early grant of indepen­
dence to the Republican's theory of retardation and close 
control and supervision.
1. The Y/ood-Porbes Mission 
Upon the assumption of Mr. Harding to the presidency, 
legal steps were undertaken to learn the existing condi­
tions in the Philippines and to ascertain what procedure
(l) Translated by Dean IT. Kalaw— "It is a perpetual 
law that no human and positive law can be perpet­
ual and a clause (in lav;) which precludes the power 
of abrogation is void from the beginning."
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his administration would take. Indirectly assumed as a
challenge to the claims made by the Filipino Independence
(2) . Mission in 1919, and to the pronouncements made by presi­
dent V'ilson before Congress, the administration, before 
attempting to make recommendations to Congress regarding 
the problem, appointed a commission of two with seven 
other members of the staff to study the local conditions. 
The mission sailed April 9, 1921, from Seattle.
The Chief Executive’s selection of General Wood as 
Chairman caused few to deny that he had picked the best 
man able to fulfill the mission brilliantly and success­
fully. Ex-Governor Forbes, as an associate member, had 
made use in this inquiry of his knowledge of finance and 
of his acquaintance with the islands. Equipped in every 
way, these t?/o brilliant men with their attaches arrived 
in Manila, May 4th. The high calibre of the investiga­
tors indicate the grsat import which president Harding 
attached to his colonial policy.
2. Findings
They traveled widely and during their four months 
stay, they made an exhaustive investigation of admini­
strative, educational, political, social, and economic
C2)The Independence Mission in 1919 (40 members) laid 
claim before Congress the establishment of the 
"stable government", the only prerequisite laid 
down by the Jones law to the early grant of indepen­
dence .
institutions. "They found," said Morse and McNair, "much
13)to praise and a good deal to censure." perhaps it would 
he fitting to state in brief the favorable and unfavorable 
aspects of their report.
They commended (1) the loyalty of the Philippines 
to American sovereignty especially during the recent World 
War when the entire American forces were withdrawn for ser 
vices in Prance, (2) the generally good public order, (3) 
the great strides in popular education and self-govern­
ment, and (4) the exceedingly prosperous economic condi­
tions. On the other hand, they pointed out (a) that the 
administration of justice had left something to be desired 
(b) that Filipinization of the j>ublic services have pro­
gressed too rapidly for effective administration; (c) that 
taxation and governmental exx>endi tures had greatly advan­
ced; and, (d) that the financial policy was disastrous to. 
the economic welfare of the islands.
3. Conclusions and Recommendations 
In the light of the Wood-Forbes Mission’s findings, 
the report concluded that the time had not yet come for 
complete independence. It was recommended that "the pre­
sent general status of the Philippine Islands continue
t
(3) Morse and McNair, Par Eastern International Rel­
ations ' p. 616 ; also Hoi/3e.£?°c A/o.32y CangresS 3ecos></
Sessiorij
until the people have had tine to absorb and thoroughly
*
master the powers already in their hands. 1 It turtner 
recommended that "under no circumstances should the Am­
erican government permit to be established in the Phil­
ippine Islands a situation which would leave the United
*
States in a position of responsibility without authority."
4. A Filipino Response 
The Report of the special mission on investigations 
to the Philippine Islands, has occasioned much comment 
and protest on the part of the Philippine public bodies 
and in the Philippine press. Public opinion was aroused 
against the charges. A book was published by Senate Pres­
ident Manuel Q,uezon and Junior Commissioner Camilo Csias, 
which contains in full detail the minute refutation of all 
the charges stated in the report. And just after the pub­
lication of the Report, a committee was at once appointed 
by the Philippine Legislature to come to the mainland to 
answer the charges and to oppose the recommendations con­
tained therein.
3. GOVERNOR GENERAL PLAYS MUSSOLINI
To give due respect to General V/ood’s knowledge of 
the local conditions, and in consideration of the admin­
istration’s policies, he was appointed in October, 1921, 
as the Governor-General, a position which he held until
his death in August, 1927. He at once set himself to the 
* Afcrse &/y7cAfe//>, Ojt>.
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task of overcoming the weaknesses which he found in the 
Insular government. His first budget wa3 twelve million 
pesos less than the preceding year. "By a Currency Act, 
by Congressional permission to increase the limit of debt 
for the Islands, and by exempting Philippine government 
bonds from taxation in the United States, the credit of 
the islands was restored, and the peso again reached par. 
These bold, benevolent strokes so characteristic of a sol 
dier saved the government from financial and economic dis 
ruption. His records show in him the presence of a prom­
inent statesman which had been overshadowed only by his 
Trussolinian methods of doing and accomplishing things.
1. His Attitude Against Government in 3usiness 
As Governor-General, he has fought the Insular Board 
of Control for six years; now suddenly, "aided by the At­
torney General’s office in Washington, he has invented 
the power to abolish it. Consequently, he put an end of 
it through an executive decrees When Harrison was gover­
nor, the Filipinos, eager to develop the islands with 
native capital, invested government’s funds in the Phil­
ippine rational Bank, in Sugar Centrals, in the develop­
ment of coal mines, and in a cemfent plant. 'Then Governor 
General Wood toured the islands from end to end in 1921, 
he immediately deplored these sad examples of "State Soc­
ialism." He overlooked the fact that Japan had built up
■¥■ /tfo s 's e  & /V c /V j / f ' ,  " F f / '  £ d S te r r ?  S fe /fZ /e /rs",

her industries with government support, and government 
patronage of industrial development in various British 
colonies. Thus he met a snag in the Board of Control, 
which had power over government industries. Being the 
Governor-General, he, as an ex-officio, automatically 
was one of the thiee members of the board. But in his 
desire to ’get the government out of business," he was in 
a minority of one. Incumbent upon his mind to do so, the 
state of affairs began rapidly to take definite shape.
2. Usurpation of Power
"To the Filipino mind the alternative was subjection 
to American capital, always more interested in overseas 
profits than in develoj)ment of the islands for the is­
landers.” Backed up by American interests, General Wood, 
sought to take these enterjjrises away from the Philippine 
government. But his attempt had met the opposition of a 
Filipino phalanx. After "every decent method failed," 
he firmly resorted to the good old technique of the Mus­
solini type.
Opponents of FiliiJino separation talked much of the 
"separation of powers." president Coolidge seemed to have 
made the '’stable government" referred to in the Organic 
Act synonymous with separation of the functions of the 
legislative and executive. It is beyond doubt that 
in the Harrison regime the natives, acting through their
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legislature, assumed a greater control on their govern­
ment than Congress had contemplated. But the nation 
Magazine reasons it out: ttY/e honor them for so doing; 
we would desxoise any people which did not attempt to en-
*
croach upon the powers of a dominant alien race."
Surely if separation of powers means anything, it 
worked two ways. By no possible interpretation of the 
law had Governor-General V/ood, executive, the right to 
substitute himself for the courts, by executive decree 
declared legislative enactments unconstitutional, or sud­
denly to assume control of organizations created by the 
legislature which have been functioning under its super­
vision for years. "Governor Wood’s usurpation of power 
smashes the boundaries," said an editorial of The ration, 
"between legislative, executive, and judiciary as no act 
of the Filipinos had ever done. It was not administra- 
*■ *t i on.'}
3. The Cabinet Crisis 
It is true there were mistakes committed during the 
Democratic administration, but that there was also more 
democracy there during that same period of time than any
other subsequent period,--no impartial observer can deny.
Democracy everywhere, Lord Bryce once expressed, is not 
noted for its wisdom but for its strength. And Governor 
Harrison firmly believed that the evils of a Democracy
* T/fs , /23 : _Dec, // /SZ6 /W , p. S3~
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3hould be self-corrected. "The process," wrote Dean 
Kalaw of the University of the Philippines, "might be
«)
a longer one, but the result would be more lasting ."
Unlike his x3redecessor who believed in the theory 
of Filipino self-help, and he, as a mere coach, General 
Wood went over as an administrator f i r s t  and foremost de­
termined to correct in person what evils and errors had 
been committed under the preceding rule. He practiced to 
the utmost that which was granted him by the Organic Act. 
He believed not in party government. .He claimed that the 
members of the Cabinet were fully responsible to him  and 
not even partly to the Insular Legislature, ’.’'hat he told 
Senate President Quezon as quoted by Dean Kalaw illustra­
tes his official attitude. "To try to dictate to my sec­
retaries of department (directed at the Council of State) 
is just like my t r y in g  to dictate to your own p r i v a t e  
secretary." He created a popularly dubbed "military Cab­
inet" which assumed serai-administrative functions; exer­
cised the power of control and supervision to a very great 
extent. "As a matter of fact, it was his interpretation 
of this phrase which was the immediate cause of the resig­
nation of the Filipino members of the Council of State,
. -32-
(4) ^alaw, M. II. , ^Foreign Affairs,' Vol. 7, p. 372
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'  (5-)
leading to a condition of virtual non-cooperation.”
There is one thing to my mind that contributed to 
the famous crisis . It  lies in the pronouncement made 
by President Earding,--rtno backward step is contemplat­
ed. ” Governor-General Wood had interpreted it in an en­
tirely different light from that of the Insular Legisla­
ture. To the former it meant that the system of govern­
ment formulated in the Philippine Organic Act was to be 
enforced. Whereas to the latter, it meant that the legis­
lative control of the government organized under the Coun­
cil of State was to be continued. The Governor unbendingly 
tried to enforce the presidential system of government; 
the Legislature, the European Parliamentary system. It is 
obviously understood what this all meant to the native 
leaders when they saw General Wood gradually assuming all 
the powers abdicated by his predecessor. Hot unlike a 
guitar’ s string steadily pulled from one side, the tight­
ened situation came to the point of breakage when the Ray
(6)
Conley case ensued.
(5) I b i d ,  p .  2 7 3
(6) Ray Conley, an American detective in Manila, 
was dismissed by the City Mayor on counts of 
irregularity. General Wood intervened, rein­
stated the policeman against the protest of , 
those directly in control. See /r’o66, tV r f e /,/>/„or’
V c w  e C tss'' / S ’ . ^  3 .8 6 , ' f Z * /
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4. The Struggle for Supremacy 
'’It  is not a pretty situation,'* wrote Senator Lodge, 
'•when for nearly five years after 1923, our imperialism 
worked so badly around Manila that there exists substan­
tially a passive revolution against cooperation between
(?)
Manila and v/ashington." The state of affairs was not at
all pleasing to both sides. Filipino-American relation
was stranded. Like two opposing military camps, one shot
charges of causing the dislocation of relationship and en-
coachment of x>owers upon the other.
Speaker Roxas of the Insular House of Representatives,
claimed that the usurpation of authority on the part of
General Wood exceeded the autocratic rule of Spain. The
latter retorted that there has been ;,a firm insistence by
the executive upon the observance of the provisions of the
Organic Act, and a sharp distinction has been maintained
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
(8)
of the government....''* Both maintained their right of v/ay. 
The protagonists of Filipinization accused the Governor- 
General of "disloyalty to American ideals and principles, 
with reversing the policy of Filipinization, with disre­
garding the authority of the Filipino heads of departments,
(?) Lodge, E . C . ,  "Our Failure in the Philippines", 
Harper’ s Monthly Magazine, Vol. 160, p. 209-18.
(8) The Salt Lake Tribune, p. 18, Jan. 2 , 1927.
with using public funds in violation of lav/, and with favor 
ing various selfish interests which wanted to exploit the
*
country.” In a special election based upon this burning 
issue, the Filipino people showed its verdict by electing 
Mayor Ramon Fernandez, a coalition candidate for the P h il ­
ippine Senate on a pro-independence and anti-Wood plat­
form. The controversy became so intense that'the admini­
stration at Washington took grave concern. President Cool- 
idge, ever cognizant of the ability and sincerity of his 
appointee, upheld the stand taken by the Governor. But the 
executive’ s judicious declaration did not altogether stew 
the tide of restlessness. It was through the Filipino re­
spect for American sense of justice and American political 
sportsmanship that put an end to it .
5 . Attempts To Oust Governor-General Wood 
During the controversy, certain steps were undertaken 
to voice the Filipino remonstrance of and. reluctance to a­
bide by with the Wood Leadership. The Insular Legislature 
having approved the action of the Filipino Councilors in 
resigning, proceeded by joint resolution to petition the 
American Government and people for the recall of General 
Wood against what was claimed to be the usurpation of power 
and tyranny. It  was upon this juncture, that president 
Coolidge, through Secretary of War Weeks, sent a cable 
stating his complete support of the island executive (based 
*  /V. A7. St/msos? "7 //<? f///?/?;*? es'' /■Sv? & /f  7/ /p. J/3
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on the interpretation of the letter of the power and duties 
of that office). Six days later, a renewed petition was 
made for General Wood's removal and for the appointment of 
a Filipino to succeed him. The following day, Secretary of 
War Weeks, too, upheld in a public statement the governor.
A second independence mission was formed, hut attempts to 
discredit the Insular executive failed.
C. PRESIDENTIAL ICC SSI PITERS
The Secretary of War and the President of the United 
States both supported the Governor's stand, it is true.
But that was not enough; the problem was not solved; the 
administration's action was not sufficient and satisfying. 
Something was to be done. Ever abiding with the American 
government's political farsightedness, President Coolidge 
sent a one-man-mission to gather facts conducive to the 
current problem of "control and supervision’* and of inde­
pendence.
1 . The Thompson Report 
After a brief yet sufficient v isit , Colonel Carmi 
Thompson, a personal envoy of the President, came back 
with specific recommendations —  twelve in a ll . Firstly, 
is a proper solution of the Islands* political problem, 
one phase of which is the pernicious deadlock between Gov­
ernor Wood and the Insular Legislature, and the other, the 
independence movement. Secondly, the postponement of a
-37-
grant of independence until the '’ islands are sufficiently 
developed to maintain an independent government,'’ hut with 
progressive grants of internal autonomy to the islands as 
conditions warrant. Thirdly, to restore cooperation, the 
transfer of the Philippines and other territories from 
the War Department to an independent civil agency and re­
moval of the "military atmosphere." Fourthly, that the 
military atmosphere has heen unfortunate in its reactions 
upon the Filipino leaders. The envoy admitted that the 
officers had excellent military records, hut evidently 
lack training and experience in the duties of civil govern­
ment, and that instead of facilitating cooperation between 
the Governor and the executive heads of the departments and 
legislative leaders, this group has been one of the factors 
which has made such cooperation d ifficu lt . Fifthly, .that 
there is no evidence of anti-Americanism in the islands to 
necessitate continued military control and that no sedition 
or insurrection i f  this country avoided "exploitation."
Sixthly, he made a flat recommendation against the sep­
aration of Mindanao from the rest of the islands "unless 
the United states were to break faith with the !roros." 
Seventhly, the necessity of strengthening American control 
over the LToros or to permit them union with the united 
Filipino people. Other recommendations included the exten­
sion of the Federal Reserve and land bank system in the
islands, the establishment of agricultural experimental 
stations by this country to develop insular resources; 
amendment by the legislature of lav/s to attract capital 
for the development of rubber, coffee, and other tropical 
products; withdrawal of the island government from private 
business ventures; and that there should be no change in 
the Jones Act and no amendment at the time by Congress of 
the Philippine Land Lav/s.
2 . Bvaluations of Designs Behind These Becommendations 
Special attention is made in the first seven recom­
mendations which clearly indicates further control and re­
tention of the islands, and the rest anticipate sinister 
designs to plant more American capital which when fully 
rooted prevents the realization of an easy and an early 
Filipino separation. Farsighted leaders of the archipela­
go point out the dangers lurking around the inplantation 
of American big business and American capital. It does 
not alone mean the possible economic dependency of the 
natives to these interests, but the inevitable paraliza- 
tion of the autonomous government and the probable aban­
donment of Philippine indej>endence which their leaders 
we re zealously guarding.
3 . Secretary Hurley in Manila 
For a time, the 'Ampson report effected an idea of 
further retention. The Filipino people, through their
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duly constituted representatives, expressed their dissatis- 
tion with the current tendency of the Washington Govern­
ment. nevertheless, imbued with the sense of American fair 
play and American idealism, they sent mission after mission 
to Washington to present their case of "self-determination" 
which is based on facts.
net
The Hoover administration, too, determinedAto evade
A
the Philippine problem, sent its special representa­
tive to Manila in the person of Secretary of War Hurley.
Let is be known on the first place that President Hoover 
himself declared:
"Independence of the Philippines at some 
time has been directly or indirectly prom- *  
ised by every President and by the Congress.'’
Three distinct factors were attached to the presence of 
Mr. Hurley in Manila. To enumerate: (1) It crossed swords 
with the American labor and agricultural interests who de­
clared themselves in favor of Philippine freedom because 
Philippine labor and products compete with theirs; (2) It
tended to balance the effect of Senator Hawes* visit ear-
(9)
H e r  in the summer; and (3) Index^endence was made remote.
3 • POSTPONEMENT OP SELF-RULE
The crisis in Philippine affairs came with the ap­
pointment of General Wood. Unquestionable the intent of
-39-
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(9) Cur. H is t . ,  Vol. 35, pp. 267-8, 1931-32
the Jones Law was to organize the government of the 
Philippines upon the model of the Federal and state 
governments of the Uni--"'' P^r.tes cased upon the doc­
trine of separation of powers with its accompanying 
checks and "balances. The Governor with all the autho­
rity vested In him (coupled by his influence) tried 
to execute In every way possible the letter of the 
Jones Law and to uphold the presidential system. The 
Filipino leaders, on the other hand, have deliberately 
aimed at supplanting the presidential system with the • 
European parliamentary system wherein the executive is 
subordin.-;te to the legislature in which all power is 
lodred. They based their right of way through the Coun­
cil of State which was established under :he authority 
granted them by &b®ernor-G-eneral Harrison, whose object 
was to facilitate Pilipinization . In the midst of the 
struggle for constitutional right, the actions of the 
Governor-General were upheld by the administration at 
Washington. Further autonomy was checked and indepen­
dence was made remote. '
Governor Wood’ s stand of further extension of the 
granting of independence v/as collaborated by the reports 
of the two subsequent special envoys. The problem had its 
culmination when President Coolid.ge sent a response to an
; -40  -
answer to the letter of Speaker Hoxas, head of the F il ­
ipino delegation, in which he declared definitely that 
the Philippine people were not yet ready for self-rule.
The letter blasted the hopes of the islanders and it 
ushered the idea of .uncertainty. It meant the postpone­
ment of Filipino self-rule. The following passage, quot­
ed from the President’ s letter illustrates the spirit of 
postponement and protraction though it recognizes the 
tremendous advance made by the Filipino x^sopls* ”I n edu­
cation, in cultural advancement, in political conceptions, 
institutional development, the Filipino people have de­
monstrated a capacity which can not but justify high hopes 
for their future .” perhaps it is with this spirit in the 
President that prompted him to send Colonel Stimson whose 
psychology of mind favored a policy of moderation.
-41-
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THE TIDE OF MODERATION 
Chapter IV .
In the preceding chapter, I have attempted to dis­
cuss, though not fully, the various developments that 
sprang out of General Wood’ s unsympathetic and rigid ad­
ministration as against the succeeding one. In this 
chapter, I will endeavor to trace the change of adminis­
trative policy both in Washington and in Manila. A special 
notice will be seen in the occasion of the sound working of 
the Jones Law in the face of an indifferent Republican re­
gime. To begin with, let me contrast first the two Repub­
lican Governors-General, Y/ood and Stimson as to their train­
ing and administrative policies.
A .  W O O D  A M D  S T r i S O I T  .
1 . Training
Governor-General Wood was trained primarily a soldier, 
an administrator, and a social worker. Hence, he loved to 
display his executive ability and experience. On the oth­
er hand, Governor Stimson was trained a prosecuting attor­
ney. His capacity as a corporation counsel, enabled him to 
learn the good and bad sides of corporations. His views, 
therefore, are those of a man who believes in economic de­
velopment along corporate lines. While the former did not 
believe in a party government in the Philippines, and from 
the beginning would have liked to do away with the semblance
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party cabinet, the latter believed in party rule and strove 
to achieve Filipino cooperation.
2» Administrative Policies 
Governor Stimson based his island policy upon the 
development of the natural resources by Filipinos them­
selves, the unification and mutual understanding of the 
Christians and Mohammedans, and the restriction of enor­
mous foreign investments. It was diametrically "opposed 
to food's policies who, whether or not expressedly allowed 
it , his American assistants encouraged the Moros to make
complaints against their Christian brothers, thus institut-
(i)
ing diseensions."  Indeed, Colonel Stimson took a definite 
stand for public avowal by the United States administration 
of a continued control of the archipelago and of guardian-
(Z)
ship against encroachment by neighboring peo^Jles until the
"experiment of training for independent self-rule is carri- 
03 )
ed through. He believed that such avowal would aid, rather 
than hinder, the cause of self-rule by discouraging politi-
(l)Kalaw, M. M . , "Governor Stimson in the Philippines", 
Foreign Affairs , p. 380.
OOChinese were excluded from the Philippines in 1905 
to protect Filipinos from Chinese cheap labor.
(S)Outlook, Vol. 147, p. 523, Dec. 28, 1927.
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cal experiments and agitation for "immediate, absolute, 
and complete independence” , and by ce'ntering American and 
Filipino thought on the really necessary steps along the 
avenue to self-government.
■3. RE3T 0RAT IOIT OF PARTY 3Y3TEJI
M r, Stimson stressed the need of the development of 
responsible native political parties and the desirability 
of appointing qualified Filipinos to executive positions.
The following quotation attributed to him reveals the trans­
itional point and the mental aptitude of the man destined to 
restore cooperation. I quote:
rtI believe that on this way the Jones 
Act can be made a bridge by which we 
can pass gradually from a rigidly sup­
ervised system of government to one 
depending more and more upon respon­
sibility  to political parties and pub- ' 
lie opinion ."*
(a )
. 1. The Council of State
Consistent with the above declared policy, he appoint-
(5)
ed in August a Cabinet which drew the confidence of the par­
ties. The establishment of the party cabinet wa^ followed
jfr S-6/rrrs0f? f A , / “t / f u r e  /% /zey d/s7<r/e.r /4e f f c t "
For. 1^ 5'9-j /
(4)The Council of State was created under the Harrison 
administration by Executive Order ITo. 37, dated Oct. 
16, 1918.
(5>This particular cabinet is s a i d  to be one of the 
strongest ever formei . Xa/s*,/*?.*?. "Got'sr^ o^
Mm ’’ /Qyfoirs y : 3yr‘Z -383/ /$£. 8 — /&Z&
MANILA 'S  NEW  POST OFFICE FROM PASIG RIVER
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on August 30, 1928, by the re-creation of the Council of 
State— the monument of a parliamentary government— by an 
executive order which reads:
'•A council of State is hereby created to 
advise the Governor General on such matters 
of public policy as he may from time to 
time lay before i t .  He shall be the pre­
siding officer of such Council of State, 
and it shall consist of such persons as 
may from time to time be appointed and 
summoned by him. Until otherwise ordered 
by him, it shall consist of the president 
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of 
Representati ves, the Majority Floor Lead­
er of the Senate, the Majority Floor Lead­
er of the House of Representatives, and (e) 
the heads of the six  executive departments."
2. Res torati on of rative Confidence
The p o l i c y  of reconstruction and moderation has been 
struck and proper restitution of native confidence has been 
on the up trend. This has been accelerated by Mr. Stim- 
son's democratic view:
"In  view of misunderstanding in past years 
I think it is worth while to record certain 
features in detail for the benefit of Ameri­
can administrators who, like myself, may be 
without previous experience in the orient, 
when I assumed office I was warned that the 
nature of the oriental was such that it would 
be dangerous for me to confer with them with­
out the presence of American witnesses. I re­
jected this advice feeling that it was better 
to trust and be betrayed than to make mutual 
confidence impossible. So far as I am aware,
(6>For. Affairs , Vol. 7, pp. 372-83, 1928-29
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I was not betrayed in a single instance; and 
the character of our conferences became such 
that I was frequently made the recijjient of 
conferences by the Filipino leaders which 
proved of priceless value to my administration.
Again, bearing in mind the responsibilities of 
leadership in political organizations in the 
United States, I was very careful never to sur­
prise the Filipino leaders of the party organi­
zations with which I was dealing by an executive 
decision of any importance. Instead, I always 
conferred with them about it beforehand, giving 
them an opportunity to discuss it  and, if  finally 
decided on, to prepare their followers for the 
announcement. ” *
The native leaders were fully satisfied with the pro­
cedure the Governor handled things, esxoecially his econ­
omic program, and commenting on it ,  ~uezon, speaking on the 
floor of the Senate says: "The views of Governor Stimson 
as to proper relations between the executive and the legis­
lature in the Philippines and the responsibilities and pow­
ers that should be granted to the .deijartment heads are sub­
stantially in accoi’d with our own.” **
3. Revival of the Parliamentary Form 
Governor Stimson's aim of seeking cooperation between 
the two branches of the government has been achieved. The 
first sign of cooperative spirit shown by the Filipinos 
was the passage of the Belo Act which furnished money for 
carrying out the administrative function (over-sight of how 
things are going nationally and locally). Undoubtedly, he 
captured the admiration and respect of the Philippine people.
On C/S'r?so/? Os? £cA<sS/' of sr?&yc's,/7*y
S&&S* /y. /to* Vi< /*?. A?. OyC>. C '/. Srb''. . 7, . 3 7 y
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Y/hen retiring as Governor-General to assume his exalted 
office in the Hoover Cabinet, he pointed out v/ith pride 
to the fact that his administration had completely restored 
the "Harrison" or semi-parliamentary type of government for 
the islands which his predecessor, General Wood, "had d is­
carded in favour of an autocratic system."
4. Honesty in Government
Upon the assumption of Colonel Davis to the office,
he indicated his desire to continue his predecessor's jjoli-
cy and suggested that the problem of the archipelago was .
economic rather than political. In his inaugural address,
he stressed the necessity of getting additional capital
invested in the islands and the need for honesty in govern­
. . (7) 
ment service.
C. PRESIDENT HOOTER*3 APPOINTEE
Since the advent of the Stimson administration, there 
existed a tine of perfect harmony and understanding between 
Manila and ¥/ashington. Cooperation went on undisturbed for 
almost two years, followed by the Davis administration, only 
to be interrupted by an incident created by the president’ s 
vice-governatorial appointment. „
C7)Davis, D . F-. "Inaugural Address", July 8, 1929 
Manila, Bureau of Printing, 1929
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1. The Roosevelt Incident
The vacancy in the vice-governorship in the Philippine 
necessitated the president to appoint a successor, and to 
that office he appointed Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt. The ap­
pointment v/as objectionable to a considerable section of 
the American Senate, to that section which believed in Am­
erica’ s Par Eastern policy of giving independence to the 
islands, whether that belief v/as predicated by the stand 
taken by the Democratic party, on the sugar beet industry, 
or on unreasoning idealism. The cry for exclusion of, at 
least protection from Philippine sugar has been answered 
by Mr. Hoover appropriately and soothingly in the person 
of Dwight D . Davis, the then Secretary of ¥ar. The Presi­
dent emphasized his first appointment by choosing an edi­
torial writer in the person of "Nick” Roosevelt. Mr. Hoov­
er ’ s appointment can be interpreted only as meaning that 
he endorses Roosevelt’ s views— unequivocably opposed to 
•  ^  ^ (8) independence.
2. The Spirit of Restlessness 
As soon as the appointment was made known to the press 
the islanders who, zealously guarding their cherished de­
sire for liberty, at once petitioned, through their duly
(8) Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt proposed the idea of selling 
the Philippines to Germany or to any other European 
power.
constituted representatives, the United States Senate to 
disapprove the appointment. Widespread restlessness pre­
vailed and the natives once more thought of their politi­
cal weapon of non-cooperation. In a public meeting in Man­
ila , the book written by Ur. Roosevelt was thrown into the 
bay. On September 1, 1930, another copy was publicly burnt 
at the foot of the statue of Balintawak where the first cry 
of the revolution against Spain was sounded.
3. A Signal Victory for Filipinos 
For a time, in spite of all the pressures, the presi­
dential appointee intended to cling on, but refused to 
leave for the islands until late in August or early in Sep­
tember. Secretary Hurley hoped for Filipino open-minded­
ness. The editorial staff of the Hew York Times gave a 
luncheon to the nominee. On the other hand, the Resident 
Commissioners at Washington explained their opposition to
t9)
the appointment; and a fiscal boycott of him was proposed
(10)
in the Philippine Legislature. Hot blind to the open op­
position, which only means another inception on non-coop­
eration, he immediately tended his resignation. In the 
meantime, the President re-appointed him as minister to 
Hungary. The whole Filipino press hailed the resignation
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(a>UewYork Times, 3 :5 ,  August 5, 1930
(10) Ibid , August 22, 1930, 11 :2 .
/
as showing American sportsmanship.
4 . Another Roosevelt
President Hoover once more went to the list of possi­
bilities  for appointment in the Philippines. Finally, he 
put his thumb on the name of Mr. Butte of Texas, whose name 
when sent to the Senate for approbation received an unam- 
imous consent. Hardly had things settled when another va­
cancy was left open by the resignation of Governor-General 
Davis, who it was said went to Paris to pay his invalid 
wife a v isit . In the meantime, wild speculations once more 
permeated the political atmosphere, president Hoover took 
the mainland and Insular leaders by s u n r is e  by appointing 
Theodore Roosevelt Jr . who was then serving as the Governor- 
General of Porto Rico. His appointment received acclamation, 
for it  left everybody content. The Insular Senate head em­
phatically declared that he favored the appointment precise­
ly on the ground that he would protect the average man. A 
high tribute was paid to him because of his liberal polici­
es. During his administration, he cooperated with the Leg­
islature; had confidence in the members of his cabinet; the 
choice of the legislature.
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.INCENTIVES TO TEE EARLY SOLUTION GF THE PHILIPPINE
PROBLEM
Chaj>ter V
The United States Congress, by its act of 1918, is 
definitely committed to grant the Filipinos their freedom 
'•after" they had demonstrated their capacity for self­
government. That car>acity to run their ov/n destiny has 
long since "been demonstrated, hut indefinite  and uncertain 
meaning has "been given to the term ’’a fte r ."  There are im­
perialists in America who claim that the word "after" means 
twenty-five years after, some who would make it fifty  years 
after, and others who declare it should be more than two 
hundred years afterl1^ How easy it is to seek an excuse to 
justify a political immorality! The moral obligation of 
the American people towards the Philijjpines, however, seems 
enough to counterbalance all  forms of imperialistic reason­
ing. Syrnpa+helic thinking Americans, like Senator William 
PI. King of Utah, insist on saying, '’Let us be honest and 
just with the Philippine people and let us keep faith in 
our promise to grant them their national independence."
It  is my purpose in this chapter to discuss not the inde­
pendence problem, but bring to light the facts that have 
brought about a nucleus for its urgent and inevitable sol­
ution. Let is be known that amidst the discussions of this
Cl) Hearing on H . R. 7233, p. 123; also on p. 130
deli cate problem involving the status of thirteen million 
inhabitants of those fair isles , certain unsuspected and un­
expected factors have entered and greatly hastened its final 
solution.
A. THE CRY FOR PROTE^TIOH
1 . The American Federation of 7.,abor 
The statistics of the 1930 census tells us that there 
are 45 f208 Filipinos in Continental United States, 34,996 
of which are in the Pacific coast. When the figures were 
made available, the alarmists at once jumped on their feet, 
pounded the xoulpit and platform tables, and pointed out with 
contempt another growing Oriental menace which would beyond 
cavil pollute American standards. The Labor Federation ever 
alert to such warnings, met in Vancouver, on December 6 and 
7, 1930. At the close of its convention, a resolution v/as 
passed to favor Filipino exclusion based on racial, social, 
and economic grounds. The Federation went on record as far 
as to advocate the liberation of these people in order to 
bring about the realization of this program.
2. The Sugar Beet Interests 
In like manner, the tariff-duty-f ree granted the P h il ­
ippines against its wishes, made the United States a favor­
able and gainful market for Filipino sugar. From year to 
year, the volume of sugar shipped to this country has in­
creased by leaps and bounds that the beet sugar industry v/as
-52-
not Ydthout grave apprehensions-, uneasiness, and misgivings.
In 1899, the first year of American occupation, Philippine 
exportation was 85 ,000 ; in 1928, as declared hy Resident Com­
missioner .Camilo Osias, was 569 ,000Jmetric tons; in 1930, 
according to :!r. Pred Cummings, President of the Beet Grow­
ers Association, in his testimony before the House Insular 
Affairs Committee, was 617,000 tons with a benefit of $44-,­
000 ,000 . "You can not convince me," said T'r. Cummings, "a 
grower of beets, or any other intelligent grower of beets, 
that it does not depress the price of sugar." V/ith this gi­
gantic threat against his association’ s interests, he declar­
ed himself and his constituents unequivocably favorable to 
giving independence to the islanders. In a ringing tone, he 
offered a challenge by declaring that it is now time "for the 
United States to stop acting as a good cousin or a good broth­
er to the whole world and that the United States ought to
( 2)
stay home and attend to ’its own business." .
3 . Other Agricultural Organizations 
The sentiment of all other agricultural organizations 
against the free entrance of Philippine products and its peo­
ple in this country is typified in a resolution by the na­
tional Grange presented to the Committee on Insular Affairs 
of the House. It reads:
(2) Ib id , p. 158
_54-
*Whereas the rapidly increasing immigration 
of people from the Philippine Islands who . 
can never he assimilated and who are parti­
cipating a serious social problem; and 
"Whereas the economic advantages and compe­
tition encountered by our farmers as a re­
sult of their inability to secure protection 
against importation and competition of P h il ­
ippine products, produced under decidedly 
inferior and un-American standards of living; 
and. . . . "
It  goes on .to remind the government of the United States 
of its intention to withdraw its sovereignty over the P hil­
ippine Islands. In its conclusion, it declared:
"Resolved, that the National Grange urge Con­
gress to speed the accomplishment of this 
purpose, to the end that the social and econ- (3) 
omic standards of our people may be maintained."
3 .  TRADE RELATIONS
1. The Free Trade: Its Establishment
From the first days of American occupation to March 8 , 
1902, no tariff preferences existed. The Philippine I s ­
lands continued to pay in full the tariff duty of goods en­
tering the United States and the latter ’ s goods going to 
the Philippines paid full tariff duty. From 1902 to Aug­
ust 5, 1909, a nev; arrangement was enforced. Philippine 
products not on the free list of the American tariff Act 
of 1897 were granted preferential reduction of 25 per cent. 
American products, on the other hand, entering the archi­
13) Ib id , p. 164
pelago were subject to full import duty. This reduction 
shows American generosity v/hich the islands would never 
forget. Whether or not this country did it on purpose, I 
cannot say, but one fact remains true that if  the United 
States were given the same preferential reduction, Spain 
would ask for the same treatment because of the ten years 
specified in the Paris treaty in which the Spanish shipping 
and products were to receive equal footing with the United 
States. At the expiration of the commercial clause of the 
Treaty of Paris another trade arrangement was enacted in 
Congress (Aug. 5, 1909 to Oct. 3, 1913) in which both sides 
received exclusive tariff preference with certain limita­
tions. Under the Democratic leadership, a new tariff act 
was approved in October, 1913. Under this act, which now 
governs American-philippine trade relationss "all  limita­
tions on duty-free shipments of Philippine products v/ere re­
moved except (Philippine goods containing foreign material 
in excess of 20 per cent of their value) the limitation of 
the maximum permissible foreign material content of Philip ­
pine manufactures. n
2• Peculiar Phase of the Free Trade 
As has been pointed above, Philippine commodities ar­
r i v i n g  in this country must pay a duty unless eighty per 
cent or more of the material of which they are made or com­
posed is of native or American origin or both. On the other
♦ /fbxo>s, "Mear/stg.... os> //./? 7*33, />.-5V?, s&J*
hand all products entering the Philippine Islands from the 
United States are exempt from custom levies without any 
limitations or specifications as to their composition. Re­
sultant of these various changes ana arrangements, the Unit­
ed States has increased its percentage of imports into the 
islands from seven in 1899 to fifty-five in 1925. That is 
a vital element in colonial policy. The seriousness of such 
a policy has been undoubtedly demonstrated in ’ the struggle 
over the revenue b ill  of 1929-30 when American products de­
manded protection against Philippine sugar and other commo­
dities, going so far as to advocate independence as a means 
of justifying a higher barrier between the United States 
and the I s l a n d s .1
3. Imposi tion of Tariff 
When the Smcot-Hawley Tariff b ill  came for debate be­
fore Congress in 1929, it was found that tariff levies were 
imposed on numerous Philippine goods. Filipino sympathiz­
ers in the enate took occasion to voice their objections 
to the proposed measure. Senator Swanson, now the Secre­
tary of the ilavy, on October 9, said:
!I want to say this, before I take my seat, 
that I am o imposed to the imposition of tariff 
duties on any if.aports from the Philippine I s ­
lands as long as they are a part of the United 
states. I hope the day will never come when 
colonial exploitation, started by Great B rit­
ain and since abandoned, shall be approved ■ 
by an American Congress.t4> ,
(4)Ib id , p. 322
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Senator Glass, speaking on the same subject, the following 
day, declared: •
ttI simply want to say that I am for in­
dependence for the ?hilipx>ines, and until 
independence is granted, I never expect to ■ 
vote for one stiver of tariff taxation upon 
the products of the islands. I prefer to 
sit here and give the products of the'Phil- 
ipoineslslands free entrance, just as free 
entrance into this country as we give to 
the products of the various 3tates which 
pass in interstate commerce, and I shall 
maintain that position as long as we hold 
the Philippine I s l a n d s . '^
Cohorts of the imposition of tariff on Philippine sug­
ar failed in their attempt and so they resorted to the in­
crease of shipping costs which will mean the exclusion of 
foreign vessels, retardation of commerce, and a possible 
misinterpretation and repudiation ; ; the United States open 
door policy. TIr. Stinson attacked the extension of the 
shipping laws to the islands and defended the present tar­
i f f  regime. There seemed present in the American mind the 
tendency to have an open trade with the rest of the world 
and at the same time to install a close door policy in the 
Philippines. And i f  colonial powers should equally adopt 
such a policy we can see what colonies mean as a cause of 
wars.
3o harmful and pernicious is the effect of this pre­
sent trade relationship between the Philippine Islands and
C5) Ib id , p. 322
the United States. This tariff policy in diverting trade 
from its natural channels has tended to obstruct economic 
development in the Philippines; more than that, it has 
tended to make those islands an economic dependency of the 
United States. I f  that was a new colonial policy, the pro­
tagonists of early Filipino separation have surely worked 
hard to block it and should have the commendation of the 
Filipino people.
C .  S O C I A L  3 T J 5 A 3 0 0
Side by side with the economic aspect of the Philip ­
pine problem is the social factor which greatly enhanced 
the final fulfillment of America’ s pledge as embodied in 
the Jones Act.
1 . Immigration and Race-Riots 
The Filipinos shared the opportunity with other
colonial subjects of the free entrance into the mainland. 
Quota? i te imposed in European countries, in the interest, 
it is said of preserving American nationality. But her 
grave mistake is apparent and the pecularity of this ar­
rangement was shown in the race riots involving Philippine 
laborers in the Yes tern coast.. Race problem has at once 
come to the attention of our statesmen. Immigration and 
race problems are no less important than national defence 
and commerce, nence, they become strong incentives to the 
struggle for independence.
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2 .  Proposed Exclusion ,
Following the unprecedented increase of Filipino im­
migrants in the Pacific coast, a demand for restriction or 
exclusion "based upon the fear, if  it continues at the pre- 
- * 
sent rate, will surely produce social and economic problems", 
necessitated legislation. Recent riots along the western 
shore precipitated a Congressional action, though contrary 
to American-Filipino relation was to be done to satisfy the
desires of an affected group. Thus in Congress, Representa-
(6)
tive Welch of Californis’ s Fifth District presented a b il l ,  
which provided for "Filipino independence with a provision 
excluding Philippine immigrants" from this country. Again 
during the hearing of the Hawes—Cutting B il l ,  a stateraent 
signed by Californis’ s ten representatives was presented to
i7 )
the Committee on Insular Affairs advocating the same thing.
3. Citizenship
I ■—  m i ■ i— l h
' Filipino citizenship needs a strict definition, no­
body can figure out what a Filipino status -is in this coun­
try. He is between two poles. He occupies an unique posi­
tion in American body politic. The problem is a living imz- 
sle to American statesmanship. "He i s , "  says Professor ITal-
* 7^*7 " 7~7?& sr
c&s? y r # y
(6) welch B il l ,  H. R. 6




colm, "neither alien nor citizen. He is held to be a cit­
izen of the Philippine Islands, a subject of the United 
States, hut not a c itizen ."  Commissioner Csias, upon an­
swering a question relative to the subject, said: "Y/e are 
not citizens of the United States and we can not he c it i ­
zens of the United States and therefore we can not train 
the hoys and girls of the Philippine Islands for American 
citizenship. We are not free and, therefore, we do not
know exactly how to train them for citizenship in a self-
19)
governing and free Philippines ."  One can sense the gravity 
of the xjroblem viewing it from the Philippine side. I f  
this state of uncertainty, "wherein we are neither citizens 
of America nor foreigners," points Speaker Roxas, "wherein 
we are not a part of the United States, and, on the other 
hand, are not outside of the United States, wherein for 
some purposes we are within and under the American Consti­
tution, and in other respects we are outside the American
Constitution---is unjust, and no self-respecting peo|)le
can live happy and contented under that status or relation-
(8)
(8) Malcolm, Roy, "A Survey of Filipino Immigration", 
Philippine Republic, p. 8, April, 1931.
C9)Hearing.. .  . on H. R. 7233, p. 363 ; ISG. "rfe
-fos / 9 - e e / ^ ' 7y>£ '/%//. /o.Z,
(10)1 bid , p.,0
I .
D. P H IL IP P IC S : A BASE
Prom the very "beginning, the protagonists of imperial­
ism advocated the retention of the Philippines on two counts, 
v iz , a commercial and a naval base. On the contrary, the 
antagonists found faults and weaknesses from this policy . 
which might involve the question of American integrity.
1. Commercial and T.Tilitary Assets 
The carrying out of the provisions of the Monroe Doc­
trine, the United States has subjected herself to the verge 
of an economic war, and for many other reasons, with "an
*
infinitesimal portion of the continent of South America."
All the more, the proximity of every Latin American port 
to European shores as it is to the United States, subjects 
the latter to the fiercest competition. This country turn­
ed its eyes to Asia and seemingly pursued the eighteenth 
century IGMIS EATUUS of establishing colonies for an "ex- 
elusive and sole market.'' The Philippines offered the * 
possibilities of commercial expansion and the essentials of 
protection laid down by Captain Mahan for a strategic pos­
ition, strength, resources.
Position: -?he Philippines could command the channels 
of the China Sea and would flank the communications between 
any European power and her colonies of the nearby shores of 
China. And with them as a coaling station, the United . 
States cruisers could infest the narrower passages of the
*& eo/e, 7T Mv/c/c *>f rje  s* ft'os'/A Xe i'/c
/6 e : jr s , /&s>&
-61-
-62-
of the Malayan territories.
! Strength: The 7083 islands that composed the archi­
pelago constitute the very strength of the Philippines 
when they are attacked. Blockade is quite impossible be­
cause of the numerous straits and passages..
Resources: TVith its 13 ,000 ,000  inhabitants and its 
vast natural resources, the United States force stationed 
in the islands can withstand a few days blockade or at­
tack.
This holds true to the present time although the Wash­
ington Conference in 1922 forbids the fortification of the 
Philippines. V/ith its teeming millions for a wide Ameri­
can market and with its geographic key position, does one 
wonder that the United States became overnight a pacific - 
power? .
2» A Liabili ty in Time of 'war
It  is true as has been shown that the islands are an 
important factor in the maintenance of American naval 
strength in the Orient and afford a base for the protec­
tion of American enterprise, in Asia. How far are the ar­
guments sound? Is there less risk for the United States 
so to upset the supposed gains? No proof is forthcoming 
to show that the Philippines ’ pay’ in an economic sense. 
Individual capitalists gain, but no figures show that 
supervision and protection do not exceed by far the gains.
9 _/£/</t So
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This is a phase in which politicians are silent.
As to national defense, the archipelago is' a source 
of weakness rather than strength, ffir. Carman Travers makes 
this clear when he asserted that the islands are "econo­
mic asset and commercial gateway in peace time, but lia-
*
bility  in time of w a r . . . '  Reliable authorities on the sub­
ject have exx>ressed the idea that in case of a war with 
any first class power in the Pacific , the American navy 
would not even attempt to defend the Philippines. Tould 
the United States still  insist on holding the islands in 
spite of these grave dangers which may cost her youthful 
blood and treasure in endless stream?
3. Possible American Ret renchment 
I f  we brush aside the "promised independence" and 
the concurrent beliefs of American handicaps in cases of 
struggle in the Par East, there is a factor which rules 
that the United States is not an exception. I f  Histox-y 
repeats itself , then this country is certain to leave 
the Philippine shores. I am now referring to the theory 
of retrenchment.
During the American struggle for independence, the 
Carribean was a naval zone of importance. Great Britain 
acquired a vast territory in that region v/ith the Isth­
mus as her final goal. But her growing power was mad?, im­
practical by the Clayton-Bulwer and the Hay-Pauncefote
■* 7~Ae (J tsZ /ooA : /£. y r : S'S9  -  9 o t / 3 , '9 3 /

treaties. The British naval power lessened in strength
and her dignity slowly retreated--it fell into practical
obsolescence. Her defences at Bermuda and Jamaica which 
were once strong are now considered ineffective.
For the same l in e ' of ,reasoning, the United States 
would do well to retrench gradually in the Philippine wa­
ters without shock to American pride. Such retrenchment 
w o u l d  be to her lasting credit and would be an evidence of 
a !,high grade of intelligence than governments have ordin-
*
arily been able to show in the handling of imperial affairs . 
This may be an incidental element in American colonial pol­
icy, but the fact remains that it coincides with the Amer­
ican thought put forth in the Organic Act.
E. E7IJSITCE3 OF A CAPABLE 3ELF-"OVSRmSITT '
So far I have shown factors that exerted a tremendous 
influence in the final solution of the problem of independ­
ence. How I have to show evidences by which Filipinos have 
qualified themselves to the claim of self-government.
1. Popular Education, Health, and Sanitation
a. Schools: In 1903, there were but 2 ,962  schools 
mostly around Manila,. The Philippine Qensus for 1918 tells 
us that there were 6 ,510 , classified aa 5 , 72Qprimaries, 508 
intermediates, 87 secondaries, 198 vocationals, 15 superior 
schools, and 2 universities (now three). The figures sug­
gest an increase of 119 per cent since 1903 or an annual 
S . /V S  • & S?c/ £2/ cA■ ffj JO.
7 ~ % t/i& fi/'fe .C c sra t/s  o f  / 9 / 8  V o / /? , T-'Z. 7 / . /? .£~
increase of 7 .9  per cent. At present, according to Speaker 
Roxas, there are 8 ,442  schools, an increase of almost 7,000 
since the inception of American regime.
V
b. Enrollment: As to the comparative number of enrolled 
students in these institutions, we had from 356,385 in 1903 
to 789,046 in 1918. A later record shows that there were 
"enrolled in the public schools, as of September, 1929,
*■
1 ,213 ,711  students, and in private schools, 1 0 2 ,4 1 3 . !’ These 
are instructed by an array .'.of 18,134 teachers, of whichl7,- 
172 are ilipinos, 501 Americans, 249 Spanish, the rest are 
Chinese, British , and British subjects. The tremendous pro­
gress thus far achieved in this field of human endeavor is 
unparalleled by any other people. This flower of American 
thought and American unselfishness is the beacon light in 
their struggle for political emancipation.
c. Literacy: Education has not alone helped improve 
their standard of living, but helped raise the percentage 
of literacy. After a comparative study of the problem, 
the Philippines is found to have a higher percentage than 
thirty-seven of the independent countries of the world not 
excluding B r a z i l , .Chile, China, Cuba, G-reece, Mexico,Nica­
ragua, Persia, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Siam, Spain, Tur­
key, Yenszuela and many others.
d. Hospitals: The establishment of hosioitals dates 
back during the Spanish rule. It was continued under the
/ / .  . v
* ffo x a s , Af. S-rear/sier... on  33
Of/as, C. /Je&r'/sie-- or, Mff.yrz33, fi.3€3
erstwhile Philippine Republic, but received its setback dur 
ing the Filipino-American war. After the war, however, the 
establishment and development of this type of institution 
received a great impetus. This was made possible by friend 
ly legislation. In 1931, there were 105 hospitals, public 
and private, 1081 dispensaries, and 51 laboratories. Gov­
ernor Davis in his annual .to the Secretary of War for 1931 
bears witness of this fact. Ee wrote: '’The development of 
hospitals, and the training of public health officers pro­
moted our health efficiency. Cur quarantine service is the
#•
best in the Par E a s t .”
e. Sanitation: Another blessing conferred upon the 
Filipino people, is the system of sanitation which greatly 
improved living conditions and reduced the prevalence of 
diseases. Perhaps it would be best to quote Junior Resi­
dent Commissioner Osias who gives us a Vivid description 
of the various health activities of the Bureau of Health 
Service which are conducive to health and sanitation.
"Immunization work, school and medical insioection, 
industrial hygiene, rat campaign, public health 
nursing, physical inspection of government employ­
ees and food handlers, cooperation with Rockefeller 
Foundation and School of Sanitation and Public 
Health, public health education, hospital labora­
tories and special service, special clinics, care 
of the insane, relief work. These are undertaken 
to improve general sanitation, housing conditions, 
sewage disposal, water supply, milk supply, public 
markets, and slaughter houses, food and food^pro­
ducts establishments and cemeteries.”**
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2. political and Governmental
a. Civil Service: In order to show the extent of
• Filipino participation in their own government, it would , 
be appropriate and timely to draw some figures from the 
civil service as of December 31, 1930. There were 21 ,348 
Filipinos and 456 Americans of which 282 are in the Bur­
eau of Education, 22 in the Constabulary, 50 in the Police 
Department, 17 in the Bureau of Public Works. The person­
nel of the bureaux of Civil service, Treasury, and Com­
merce and Industry, is entirely Filipino and the Bureau 
of Posts is more than 99^%  Filipino. To state it in an­
other way, the American officials are but i M  of the total 
in the government service.
b. Administration of Justice: The Judges of First 
Instance, with but two exceptions, and the justices of the 
Supreme Court, four of nine, are native inhabitants. The 
Chief Justice is a native. The Philippines is divided in­
to 28 judicial districts, in each of which there is one or 
two judges of First Instance. Assisting these judges are 
38 auxiliary judges. There is only one system of courts, 
and these courts are both courts of lav/ and courts of equi­
ty. As to the character of the Philippine courts, one 
writer describes it in this manner:
"A pure, impartial, and upright judiciary has 
been created and an antiquated method of" judi­
ciary procedure, which prolonged litigation and 
ruined litigants with the law’ s delay, has been
replaced "by one which assures to all who d i l i ­
gently seek its aid a fair hearing without fa­
vor and justice without price ."*
3. Balanced Trade 
The balance of trade for the first eleven months of 
1932 was favorable to the islands by 19 ,834 ,871  pesos 
official figures from the Bureau of Customs show. Foreign 
trade amounted to 315 ,579 ,407  pesos; inraorts totaled 1 4 7 , ­
872,268 pesos; exports mounted to 167 ,827 ,193  pesos. I f  
the December figures were to be added, it approximated to, 
foreign trade 340,000 ,000  pesos, imports 158 ,000 ,000  pesos, 
and exports 182 ,000 ,000 , v/ith a favorable balance of at 
least 24 ,000 ,000  pesos.
There is no more need to go into further details as 
to the presentation of facts to justify the Filipino claim 
for self-rule or to justify the prompt solution of the prob 
lem. A quotation from the Honorable William Cameron Forbes 
former Governor-General and an earnest opponent of the 
"School of Independistas", will suffice to elucidate the 
cultural, material, and social conditions existing in the 
islands, nay, their fitness for self-government. He 
declared: .
"There was then almost universal illiteracy and 
ignorance. Standards of living were low. How 
with higher wages and working conditions, with 
trade and commerce enormously increased, with 
transportation vastly improved by railroads, roads, 
bridges and harbor improvements and with communi­
cation established with all parts of the v/orld--
*-# 7~%e Se/s7</ay / 9 3 3  , / 3
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steamers of all important lines plying in the 
Orient now call at Manila--with many new manu­
factures and industries, cement, rubber, sugar 
established, the people of the islands are much 
more prosperous than they were. Irrigation has 
made them practically self-supporting in the 
matter of food production. Their outlook on 
world affairs , with better educational fa c il i ­
ties, has widened enormously. "
CONCLUSION
"There never has been a time,* says the Honorable 
William H. King, ’♦since the American forces landed upon 
Philippine soil that the Filipinos were willing to be an 
American colony or even an American State. They have de­
sired to be free; they have had confidence in their abil­
ity to govern themselves and to maintain an Independent 
and sovereign state, possessing a liberal form of govern­
ment and adequate to protect its people and discharge its
*  CO “  '
international obligations.” The senior Senator from Utah
has exposed himself of his real knowledge of the Philip ­
pine people. His farsighted declaration, i f  an honest 
OTsinion persist over a biased mind, is true in every way. 
In fact, in my historical discussions, I made it clear 
that even amidst America’ s sympathetic, responsible, and 
progressive administration, the Filipino people continued 
and st ill  continue to agitate for an independence with no 
string attached to i t .  Typical of this strong xolea and 
desire for self-rule, i f  we consider it typical, is a 
statement made by Senate President Quezonr ”1 would rath­
er see the Philippines sunk to the bottom of the sea than 
have them remain in permanent dependence upon any nation .” 
This thought has been the guiding spirit which, pro: ...t 
ed the natives to oppose the autocratic x^olicy of C-eneral
¥ood. Again we note this spirit moving when President
//
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Coolidge furnished a temporary check to their earnest agi­
tation. The campaign will continue, expressed Speaker Rox- 
as to whom the President’ s letter v/as addressed, in spite 
of the administration’ s formal declaration.
I have shown that his campaign was answered not in 
vain. The administration appointed a man sympathetic with 
the Filipino cause and cognizant of the colonial policy 
announced in the Jones Act. Cooperation between Manila and 
Washington which v/as obstructed during the Wood administra­
tion was restored at this juncture. It was this cooperation 
that made possible the tremendous advance in the various 
fields of human endeavor.
The American colonial policy in the Philippines, in  
spite of minor mistakes and misunderstanding on both sides 
of the Pacific , has been an untold blessing in those love­
ly isles . The sj)lendid highways and efficient forms of com­
munications uniting the linguistically divided groups; the 
artisian wells, v/hose gushing silvery waters brought new 
life  to the people; schools and colleges, whose ever increas' 
ing and ever spreading light illumine the dark corners of 
every home; and the unmuzzled newsjjaper service marks an­
other day in the Filipino national l i fe ,  are few of the 
material benefits derived from this humanitarian policy.
Has the United States remained content v/ith this un­
paralleled achievement? Uncle Sam has been willing to go
-72-
a step further. I say willing "because in January, 1933, 
in conformity with its announced policy, the United States 
Congress has passed over \ president Hoover's veto what 
is known as the Hawes-Cutting TBill granting independence 
to the Philippines ‘after a "supx^osed limited time." I 
intended to discuss it here, but because time and space do 
not allow me to do so, 1 leave it to some other student as 
a subject for another thesis. .
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